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This paper tests the hypothesis that monopoly power of school districts allows bureau­
cratic expansion and fosters poor academic performance in the public school system in 
California. Evidence indicates that monopoly power is positively associated with 
employment of administrator s and teachers, and therefore supports the bureaucratic 
expansion hypothesis. While numbers of teachers do not in¯ uence performance meas­
ures, numbers of administrators are shown to positively aŒect performance ± results 
that suggest that too many teachers, but too few administrators , are employed. While 
bureaucracy theory may explain the resource misallocation, other reasons might 
include rising public pressures on hiring teachers over administrators , spending equal­
ization policies, and the weak California economy in the period under investigation. 
I . INTRODUCTION of administrators and shift resources to other endogenous 
inputs such as teachers and other staŒ are present, 
It is commonplace to blame poor education performance on resources could be misallocated in the sense that too 
lack of teachers or funding, but it is uncommon to blame many other resources are employed relative to administra ­
poor performance on lack of administrators. A growing tors. California has recently implemented class-size reduc­
public perception is that US public schools are increasingly tion policies that, in eŒect, shift resources toward teachers 
burdened by bureaucracies that sti¯ e creativity of teachers and away from other resources. While such reallocation 
through standardization and control of their activities. may raise performance, it is important to recognize that 
Over-expanded bureaucracies are also believed to crowd- public policy changes are not private market-driven as 
out funding that might be better allocated to teachers, equip- would occur when pro® t-maximizing ® rms reallocate 
ment and other inputs in the production of education. resources due to competitive pressures. Rather, public poli-
Despite appearances of growing support for this view, little cies are chosen within public or political markets, and, as 
empirical evidence is available with which to assess whether the public perceives that there are too many administra ­
or not school bureaucracies have over-expanded. This paper tors, pressures arise to reallocate resources away from 
examines what role school bureaucracies play in the per- administrators and towards other inputs. Whether reallo­
formance of the public school system of California, where cation improves performance by allocating resources more 
student performance or achievement is measured by SAT e� ciently is an empirical issue. 
(School Achievement Test) scores and dropout rates. Resource misallocation might also arise when school dis-
That performance is inversely related to bureaucratic size tricts or states experience signi® cant changes in school 
within an over-expanded public school system is one populations, state budgets, or adverse economic environ­
hypothesis. A counter-hypothesi s is that bureaucracies ments. California has experienced a dramatic rise in 
are too small and therefore their expansion would raise student population ± over 1.2 million since 1983± 1984, 
performance. This could arise in various ways. If, for which represents more students than currently served by 
1instance, substantial public pressures to minimize numbers 42 other states. Moreover, during much of the 1990s 
Unless otherwise stated, data in this section is from California Department of Education and the California Legislative Analyst’s O� ce. 
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California lagged behind most other states in output 
growth which has signi® cantly reduced revenues for state 
and local governments. These factors appear to have sig­
ni® cantly impacted the public school system. While 
spending-per-student was roughly at the US average in 
1976, California averaged US$4724 per student in 1994± 
1995, which was US$1170 less than the national average of 
US$5894 and contributed to a national ranking of 42.2 
Even under strong economic conditions it is debatable 
that resources are e� ciently allocated in public markets, 
but it becomes more doubtful during times of economic 
distress. Although conditions may be temporary, the possi­
bility remains that bureaucratic resources are too scarce 
and their expansion would raise performance, even though 
public pressure may result in further contraction. 
These hypotheses are examined on a data set that includes 
all school districts in California over 1992 and 1993. The 
focus on California provides a rich and large data set to 
examine the role that bureaucracy plays on academic per­
formance. The public school system (primary and second­
ary) is the nation’s largest with 1002 school districts, 
employing over 410 000 employees, with over 11 000 admin­
istrators, and servicing over 5.3 million pupils. Funding in 
1996± 1997 was $32 billion. Over 12% of children in kinder­
garten through grade 12 reside in California, or one of eight 
US students in 1994± 1995. The focus on California also 
provides for an empirical examination within a common 
set of funding constraints. California’s Proposition 98 of 
1988 guarantees a minimum level of state support for all 
schools and is an important determinant of school spending 
levels. As each state has its own budgetary institutions and 
mandates, cross-state examination may incorrectly conclude 
that variation in academic performance or resource employ­
ment is caused by bureaucracy when that variation results 
from diŒerences in budgetary institutions. Most states also 
attempt to equalize across school districts on the basis of 
income and past performance, but do so with diŒerent inten­
sity, and therefore equalization eŒorts are also potentially 
important factors that explain cross-state variation in 
performance. This paper avoids these problems by empiri­
cally testing hypotheses using data only on California and 
therefore eliminates cross-state diŒerences in budgetary 
institutions and equalization eŒorts that would otherwise 
in¯ uence relationships between bureaucracy and perform­
ance of public school systems. 
I I . BUREAUCRACY MODEL AND 
PERFORMANCE IN PUBLIC 
EDUCATION MARKETS 
Bureaucrats, or administrators , are both substitutes of and 
complements for other inputs in the production of educa­
tion. In their managerial role they allocate resources and, 
to some degree, assume risk that eŒorts do not meet per­
formance standards placed on them by elected politicians 
and/or voters and parents. They are complements since 
their productivity is linked with employment of other 
inputs such as teachers, staŒ, and classrooms. 
Administrators have substitutes since other employees 
may also take on the managerial roles of decision-making 
on various activities such as teaching methods and overall 
policy-making. Administrators provide a vital function in 
the production of education but, as with any scarce 
resource, may be overused or underused relative to other 
resources. 
Optimality conditions for the e� cient allocation of 
administrators follow from conventional production 
theory that models production as a function of marginal 
products of inputs, input costs, and budgets. Optimal allo­
cations arise when marginal product-to-resource price 
ratios are equal across inputs as developed in the standard 
isoquant and iso-budget model of microeconomics. Inputs 
are administrators, teachers, other staŒ, buildings, land 
and other endogenous inputs that produce education. 
Optimal levels of inputs for a given education budget 
arise when reallocation that raises production without cost­
ing more is impossible. 
Some inputs such as parentage and socioeconomic char­
acteristics are exogenous in the sense that public schools 
cannot pick-and-choose students. However, these inputs 
are important because they may aŒect productivity of 
endogenous inputs such as teachers or administrators. 
For instance, heterogeneous student bodies cause marginal 
products of teachers and administrators to vary by school. 
Similarly, input prices, as well as budgets, vary across 
locations thus causing variation in optimal input ratios. 
Optimal resource allocation will therefore vary across 
locations and suggests that simple observation of variation 
in student± teacher or administrator ± teacher ratios across 
schools do not necessarily indicate varying degrees of 
e� ciency. 
Education in a monopolistic market 
The growing literature on government monopoly suggests 
that public school systems are characterized by a high 
degree of monopoly power. Private competitive markets 
are generally believed to allocate resources e� ciently, but 
Niskanen’ s (1971) theory of bureaucracy predicts that 
resources are not e� ciently allocated in public markets 
that lack competition and control by sponsors such as 
elected o� cials or parents in the case of education. 
Bureaucracy theory predicts that, because pro® t maximiza­
tion is not a goal of bureaus, other rewards are pursued. In 
public education, rewards may include maximization of 
California’s Rankings, 1994± 1995, ED FACT Sheet, Education Data Partnership, February 1996. 
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budgets, salaries and employees, as well as pursuit of 
amenities such as vacation time, plush o� ces and attractive 
classrooms. Academic performance is another possible 
pursuit, but this direction would only be emphasized in 
competitive settings and/or when administrators are eŒec­
tively constrained by sponsors (parents or politicians) that 
prefer this direction. At issue is the extent to which mon­
opoly conditions allow administrators to pursue goals that 
favour their interests over interests of those who want a 
public school system that e� ciently delivers high perform­
ance. 
Within a public exchange model whereby voters/parents 
and policymakers determine education policies, voters/ 
parents communicate via voice and exit options to school 
administrators.3 Voice options include voting and expres­
sing views directly to administrators and exit options indi­
cate the extent to which dissatis® ed parents may move their 
children from one school to another as they search for 
preferred education programmes. Exiting is a last resort, 
as developed in Charles Tiebout’ s (1956) model of `voting­
with-your-feet’ , and exercised when parents conclude they 
cannot eŒectively in¯ uence local policies through voice 
options. The Leviathan model of Brennan and Buchanan 
(1980) argues that credible threats of exit are an eŒective 
means of maintaining or improving programme quality 
because policymakers are better able to pursue self-
interests when few exit doors are available. With relatively 
few competitors, the Leviathan model predicts that 
administrators are able to pursue policies re¯ ecting their 
narrow interests such as bureaucratic over-expansion, as 
opposed to simply pursuing parental interests of high 
quality education. 
Public school systems in California oŒer limited exit 
options. It might appear that choices are plentiful with 
over 7700 public schools in over 1000 school districts and 
57 counties, but parents are routinely assigned particular 
schools within their districts.4 These `exclusive territories’ 
spawn local monopolies whereby parents must undertake 
costly relocation if they send children to better schools, 
even though moves may be just a short distance. 
Exclusive territory arrangements limit exit options and, 
according to the Leviathan model, allow academic per­
formance to suŒer as administrators are freer to pursue 
self-interests. 
Financing of public education also discourages competi­
tion from private schools since individual tax assignments 
are mostly unrelated to whether one has school-age chil­
dren or to numbers of children.5 This is simply a conse­
quence of the ability-to-pay principal of taxation whereby 
tax bills are not assigned on the basis of bene® ts received, 
as well as attempts to tax third-party bene® ciaries of public 
education. Primary recipients of public education are there­
fore essentially charged zero unit prices and stands in direct 
contrast to private education where unit prices re¯ ect non­
zero marginal (private) costs. Private education carries a 
unit price that far exceeds the zero unit price of public 
education and, as a result, public education dominates pro­
vision of education as this price advantage keeps the pri­
vate education market relatively small and perhaps not a 
particularly strong competitive threat to public education. 
Until school vouchers or other policies signi® cantly break 
the price advantage, the public market will undoubtedly 
continue to dominate the education market.6 Currently, 
the public market controls over 90% of the market at the 
primary and secondary level in the USA, as measured by 
dollars spent on education. 
A small private market in education indicates lack of 
competition and may suggest signi® cant monitoring prob­
lems for parents/taxpayers who are interested in high 
academic performance. Niskanen (1971) argues that mono­
poly conditions allow public employees to operate at rela­
tively high levels of autonomy from sponsors when there 
are high monitoring costs and lack of private market coun­
terparts with which to make comparisons of such items as 
costs and performance. Since relatively few school person­
nel are elected, and given the autonomy that tenure oŒers 
many teachers, sponsors are likely to ® nd oversight a rela­
tively di� cult endeavour, especially when there are limited 
private market counterparts with which to make compar­
isons. Indeed, such conditions may make it extremely di� ­
cult for sponsors to eŒectively assess whether arguments 
for higher funding made by school administrators and 
teachers’ unions stem from self-interested attempts to 
over-expand or genuine attempts to improve educational 
performance in least-cost manners. 
California’ s system of shared taxation may also encou­
rage monopoly power in the public school system.7 Local 
school districts used to be mostly funded by local revenues, 
but for the last 25 years funding has been dominated by 
decisions made in the state capital of Sacramento. 
Propositions 13 and 98, with the latter passed in 1988, 
mandate minimum funding guarantees for kindergarten 
through community colleges. Proposition 98 constraints 
now account for roughly 80% of total funding. Perhaps 
3 
These options were introduced in Hirschman (1970) and are discussed in the context of government in Marlow (1992) and, within a 
model of public education, in Marlow (1997). 
4 
See West (1990). 
5 
Tax bills even tend to be lower for parents when tax deductions and credits are awarded on the basis of numbers of school-age children. 
6 
A rapidly expanding literature focuses on private schools. Research includes Sonstelie (1979), Martinez-Vazquez and Seaman (1985), 
West and Palsson (1988), Hamilton and Macauley (1991), Couch et al. (1993), and Newmark (1995). 
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See California Legislative Analyst’s O� ce, January 1995 for a discussion of school ® nance. 
the most important constraint is imposed by the Serrano v. 
Priest ruling of 1972 in which the Supreme Court of 
California mandated restructuring of the school ® nance 
system to virtually eliminate spending diŒerences between 
school districts on the basis of wealth. In eŒect, court rul­
ings mandated that ® nance be tied to a system of shared 
taxation whereby the state government was responsible for 
collecting taxes from local governments and then returning 
revenues to school districts on the basis of factors such as 
numbers of students and redistribution in the direction of 
poorer districts. This funding system limits abilities of local 
o� cials to make local funding decisions and constrains the 
ability of school districts to compete with one another on 
the basis of how well they use local funds to deliver quality 
school programmes. 
Some school districts ± especially wealthy ones ± did not 
like the system of shared taxation. Fischel (1989) argues 
that Proposition 13 was caused by Serrano since it allowed 
high property value school districts/counties to bypass 
some of the redistribution required by Serrano. 
Proposition 13 capped property tax rates and growth in 
assessed value, reducing by 54% the amount of property 
taxes available to fund services provided by cities, counties, 
school districts, and other agencies.8 Silva and Sonstelie 
(1995) ® nd that Serrano created some equalization across 
school districts, but also contributed to a statewide decline 
in average funding per student. The US General 
Accounting O� ce (1997) concludes that California needs 
to shift 35% more state funds from wealthy to poor or 
middle-income districts in order to meet equalization cri­
teria, with current imbalances resulting from wealthier dis­
tricts raising supplemental fees and parental contributions 
as well as political forces in the redistribution process. 
California’s shared taxation system contributes to school 
district monopoly power to the extent that it reduces exit 
options of parents who are dissatis® ed with funding deci­
sions of local school administrators. In eŒect, shared taxa­
tion protects and increases monopoly positions of school 
districts since it restricts inter-district competition on the 
basis of taxation, thus eŒectively creating one large mon­
opoly government from which parents cannot easily 
escape, and according to the Leviathan view, to poor per­
formance of public schools. 
Implications of monopoly view 
An implication of the monopoly view is that school admin­
istrators have an interest in over-expanding that exceeds 
their interest in improving educational performance. As 
discussed above, over-expansion may take place in any 
of the endogenous inputs of the education production 
function, but it is increasingly common to predict over­
expansion in the hiring and associated funding of admin­
istrative positions. A testable hypothesis is then that the 
greater is monopoly power of public school systems, the 
greater is administrative over-expansion which leads to 
lower academic performance. 
Anderson et al. (1991) take the monopoly model a step 
further with the prediction that administrators prefer to 
over-expand by hiring additional non-teachers over 
teachers because the latter enjoy higher autonomy and 
are therefore more di� cult for administrators to control. 
Expansion of secretaries and clerks are also hypothesized 
to provide non-pecuniary income to administrators in the 
form of services. Non-teachers are also less organized than 
teachers which creates less trouble for administrators 
because unions attempt to mandate work rules and hiring 
practices that favour teachers. Finally, because teachers are 
often tenurable, they enjoy relatively high autonomy from 
administrators. Empirical investigation of cross-state vari­
ations in 1984 reveal support for their predictions since 
states with relatively large educational bureaucracies tend 
to perform relatively poorly on standardized tests and also 
tend to have relatively high dropout rates. They also ® nd 
that greater employment of non-teachers and aides exert 
negative eŒects on performance, but teachers exert positive 
eŒects on performance. 
However, it should be noted that non-optimal alloca­
tions of educational inputs do not necessarily indicate pres­
ence of an inverse relation between administrative 
resources and performance. As Brewer (1996) discusses, 
too many administrators may be re¯ ected in diverse 
ways. In an extreme version, an inverse relation between 
administrative resources and performance exists, as when 
their employment is characterized by marginal products 
below zero, and therefore, simple scaling-back of adminis­
trators raises total product or performance. Under this 
version, a negative coe� cient on administrative employ­
ment would be found in a regression explaining perform­
ance. A weaker version has administrators not exerting 
direct negative eŒects on total performance, but nonethe­
less they are less productive than other inputs such as 
teachers. Shifting a dollar at the margin from administra ­
tors to teachers raises performance, but note that this 
weaker version of unproductive administration does not 
indicate an inverse relationship between administrators 
and performance since marginal products are positive. 
But, the positive marginal in¯ uence of another dollar 
spent on teachers or other inputs exceeds that of adminis­
trators under this weaker version as would be evidenced by 
diŒerences in estimated coe� cients (divided by their sal­
aries) in regression equations. Brewer (1996) ® nds little 
In a study of public schools in California, Downes (1996) ® nds evidence that school districts had monopoly power before and after 
Proposition 13, though somewhat less so after Proposition 13. Evidence of bureaucratic behaviour was that administrators substituted 
improved student performance for greater numbers of administrative staŒ. 
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consistent evidence of statistically signi® cant eŒects of 
school administration on educational performance in his 
study of 700 New York school districts over 1978± 1987.9 
I I I . OTHER REASONS FOR INEFFICIENCY 
While it may be true that ine� cient allocation of adminis­
trators causes poor performance, not all ine� cient alloca­
tions are necessarily a product of bureaucratic monopoly 
power. There are various reasons apart from self-serving 
behaviour for why administrators may be poorly allocated 
in public school systems. One possibility stems from equal­
ization policies that attempt to distribute funding equally 
across locations, but are not tied to optimal resource allo­
cation. For instance, equalization will not tend to promote 
more teachers-assistants in area A simply because they are 
relatively cheap or more productive and discourage hiring 
of teachers-assistants in area B simply because they are 
relatively more expensive and less productive. Although 
such allocations would be e� cient, it is questionable that 
equalization mandates focus on providing more e� cient 
resource allocations. It is more likely that equalization 
eŒorts focus on providing funding that creates uniformity 
in teacher± student ratios and other parameters that are 
believed to be strongly linked to academic performance. 
However, as previously argued, with diŒerences in input 
prices and marginal products there is no reason to suspect 
that uniformity in teacher± student ratios would re¯ ect 
optimal allocations across schools. Moreover, there 
appears to be little evidence that such input ratios are 
systematically linked to student performance.10 This dis­
cussion suggests that equalization eŒorts may mandate 
ine� cient input combinations and therefore contribute to 
poorer academic performance. Mandates may create too 
few or too many administrators and in this way exert an 
independent eŒect on allocation of administrators (as well 
as other inputs) that in¯ uences the relationship between 
administrators and academic performance and is apart 
from how equalization may create monopoly power that 
administrators exploit by over-expanding their domain. 
Public pressures to limit administrators, but expand 
teachers or other inputs, may cause ine� cient resource 
allocation as well. In 1996, California approved a class-
size reduction initiative that in eŒect raises the hiring prior­
ity of teachers. If such policies are inconsistent with 
improved resource allocation, then another reason for inef­
® ciency arises that is unrelated to monopoly powers of 
school bureaucracies. Note that these policies may cause 
a positive empirical relation between administrators (or 
other inputs) and performance when schools that are not 
subject to such pressures allocate e� cient levels of admin­
istrators that exceed areas under pressure to hire too few 
administrators. This scenario suggests that greater num­
bers of administrators are positively related to performance 
and therefore provides a counter-hypothesi s to the extreme 
version that predicts a negative relationship between 
administrators and performance. 
Finally, because resource reallocations arise in response 
to many factors such as changes in input prices, productiv­
ity (technology), budgets, as well as public perceptions and 
laws, changes take time to fully occur. Reallocations may 
be especially transitory during times of signi® cant econ­
omic distress of the order that California experienced in 
the early to mid-1990s. Although temporary, resource allo­
cations in any particular year are not necessarily e� cient, 
and therefore we must be careful not to conclude that ex­
amination of one or more year’s of data necessarily indi­
cates steady-state equilibrium relationships between 
administrators and performance. California appears to be 
playing `catch-up’ with students± teacher ratios and other 
input-related parameters and therefore this examination of 
the 1992± 1993 relationships are not necessarily long-term 
relationships nor are they necessarily indicative of relation­
ships in other states. 
IV. EMPLOYEE AND PERFORMANCE 
EQUATIONS 
Relationships between employees and performance are ex­
amined using counties in California as the unit of observa­
tion. The basic hypothesis is that monopoly power expands 
hiring beyond e� cient levels, which then in¯ uences per­
formance of public schools. This paper focuses on employ­
ees as the vehicle for bureaucratic over-expansion and 
separately considers three types of employees: administra ­
tors, teachers, and non-teachers. The following models of 
cross-county school employment and performance are 
estimated: 
EMPLOYEEi ˆ f …HERFi;DISTRICTSi;DENSITYi† …1† 
PERFi ˆ f …EMPLOYEEi;HERFi;DENSITYi;TAKERi; 
EDUCATIONi†: …2† 
where EMPLOYEEi ˆ administrators , or teachers, or 
non-teachers, per primary and secondary student, 
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Brewer (1996) suggests a third version based on the hypothesis that adverse eŒects on performance will be exerted more often by central 
administrators than local administrators. This is consistent with the Brennan and Buchanan (1971) hypothesis that argues that cen­
tralization of government promotes its over-expansion. Brewer (1996) ® nds some support for this third hypothesis that predicts that the 
greater the number of central administrators, the lower is overall performance. 
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In a well-cited study that examines 65 studies in the input± output literature, Hanushek (1986) ® nds little evidence that such input ratios 
are linked to student performance. 
HERFi ˆ Her® ndahl index score for student enrolment by 
school district; DISTRICTSi ˆ number of school districts 
per 1000 students; DENSITYi ˆ population density, popu­
lation divided by square miles; PERFi ˆ verbal or math 
SAT scores, or dropout rates; TAKERi ˆ percentage 
of high school seniors taking the SAT; 
EDUCATIONi ˆ median number of years of schooling. 
The seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) method is 
used to estimate the parameters of the system of employ­
ment and performance equations by accounting for con­
temporaneous correlation in the errors across equations. 
This is a recursive model that consists of a series of en­
dogenous variables that are considered as a group because 
they appear to bear a close conceptual relationship to one 
another. Employment and performance measures are often 
grouped together as indicators of public school perform­
ance by both the public and educators and therefore the 
SUR technique appears to be appropriate here. 
Relationships between these equations are indicated when 
the error terms of these equations are correlated and, in 
this case, the SUR model allows for more e� cient estimates 
than would arise under estimation by ordinary least 
11 squares. 
Six equations are estimated since there are three types of 
employment (teachers, non-teachers, and administrators) 
and three performance measures (math SAT, verbal SAT, 
and drop out rates). Data for these variables are available 
for most of the 57 counties for 1992 and 1993, and the 
system of equations are estimated separately for each 
year. Two sparsely populated counties did not participate 
in many of the data collection eŒorts of the California 
Department of Education. Signi ® cance of estimated coe� ­
cients is based on two-tailed tests at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels. 
Unless otherwise indicated, raw data are provided by the 
California Department of Education and usually was avail­
able at the level of school districts. These data were aggre­
gated to the county level and then compiled into a master 
® le with data collected from other sources. Data at the 
county level collected from the California Statistical 
Abstract of 1996 are: population, area in square miles, 
and median numbers of years of schooling. All data are 
available for 1992 and 1993, except for median education, 
which was only available for 1990. It is appropriate to use 
counties as the unit of observation since school districts in 
California are organized and overseen by county superin­
tendents. Therefore, while there are various numbers of 
school districts within each county, they all come under 
12 the same superintendent, or central administrative o� ce. 
All counties operate under similar equalization eŒorts that 
are administered at the state level, and the data aggregation 
allows consideration of the variation that is measured 
across counties, but at the same time, intergovernmental 
or interschool competition is measured within each county 
by the Her® ndahl score. 
Equation 1 shows the hypothesized determinants of 
three measures of school employees: administrators, 
teachers, and non-teachers.13 Three measures are consid­
ered so as to investigate whether greater monopoly power 
exerts diŒerential eŒects on diŒerent employee classi® ca­
tions. Previous discussion suggests that such a breakdown 
is appropriate. Anderson et al. (1991) argue that bureau­
cracy theory predicts that administrators prefer to hire 
non-teachers over teachers, and the breakdown into three 
types of employees allows examination of whether diŒer­
ential eŒects are displayed. Previous discussion also indi­
cated that an ine� cient allocation of employees does not 
necessarily require a negative relationship between admin­
istrators, or other employees, and performance. Rather, 
ine� ciency may be present even though marginal products 
are positive, and reallocation from one input to another 
raises performance. This model allows one to determine 
if one or more employee classi® cations yields, at the mar­
gin, higher gains in performance than another classi® ca­
tion. 
The Her® ndahl index score is the sum of squares of 
school districts’ total enrolment within a school district. 
Borland and Howsen (1992, 1993) use Her® ndahl scores 
to measure intergovernmental competition and ® nd that 
less concentration is related to higher performance of pub­
lic schools. In Equation 1 it is hypothesized that higher 
levels of concentration lead to greater monopoly power 
that enables over-expansion of employment. The 
Her® ndahl score based on 12th grade enrolment was also 
measured but because it did not alter the empirical results, 
those estimations are not be displayed here. Numbers of 
school districts is expected to exert a positive eŒect on 
employment based on the assumption that greater scale 
economies associated with centralization of supply are 
signi® cant and therefore more districts require more 
employees ± especially administrators and non-teaching 
staŒ. Population density is anticipated to exert a positive 
in¯ uence on employment based on the assumption that 
urban areas have greater problems associated with crime 
and congestion, and a greater number of non-English­
speaking students that require more employees than rural 
areas. 
11 
As Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991: 310) discuss, SUR estimation is basically a two-stage estimation procedure that results in consistent 
and asymptotically e� cient estimates. 
12 
Data collection at the level of school district would provide other information, but also would entail signi® cant eŒort in locating 
reliable data on education levels and population densities for over 1000 school districts in each of two years. 
13 
Non-teachers are a California Department of Education classi® cation for the sum of administrators, assistant administrators, pupil 
services staŒ, and special services staŒ. 
The determinants of the three measures of performance 
are listed in Equation 2. These measures are the Scholastic 
Aptitude Test (SAT) scores on verbal and math tests and 
the dropout rate. As discussed above, the eŒects of num­
bers of employees on performance are ambiguous. The 
extreme version of the monopoly model hypothesizes a 
negative eŒect whereby higher employment lowers per­
formance and is often expressed for the administrative 
component of employment. However, a weaker version 
of the monopoly model hypothesizes that positive eŒects 
of employment on performance also provide evidence of 
the monopoly model when marginal products divided by 
resource prices of administrators are below those of other 
staŒ. The hypothesized sign on the employee variable is 
therefore an empirical question to be resolved by the data. 
The Her® ndhal score is expected to exert a negative 
in¯ uence on performance based on the monopoly model 
that predicts that greater monopoly power allows em­
ployees to pursue their interests at the expense of higher 
performance. Population density is expected to exert a 
negative in¯ uence on performance because of the common 
perception that urban areas have more problems that 
might negatively in¯ uence performance (e.g. crime, conges­
tion, unemployment, and poverty) than rural areas. The 
percentage of high school seniors taking SAT tests is 
expected to exert a negative in¯ uence on test scores because 
a higher test-taking pool means that more lower-aptitude 
students are included in the pool. Median education is 
expected to be positively related to performance based 
on the expectation that higher educational achievement 
of parents /communities positively in¯ uences academic 
achievement of public school students. 
Table 1 displays summary statistics of the variables from 
the pooled sample. A few observations follow. Average 
employees per student ratios are 0.003 (administrators) , 
0.049 (teachers), and 0.007 (non-teachers). There are 
roughly 333 students per administrator, 20 students per 
teacher, and 143 students per non-teacher. SAT verbal 
scores exhibit an average of 419 (out of a possible 800), 
with a range of 456 to 364. SAT math scores exhibit an 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
average of 476, with a range of 528 to 419. Dropout rates 
range from 0± 8% , with a mean of 3.65% . Her® ndahl 
scores average 0.295 and range from 1.0± 0.056. 
Estimation of the 1992 equation 
Table 2 displays SUR estimations of employment and per­
formance equations for 1992. The ® rst column displays 
estimation of the teachers per student equation. The 
Her® ndahl score exerts a positive, as hypothesized, and 
signi® cant in¯ uence on numbers of teachers thus providing 
evidence that market power results in higher use of 
teachers. Numbers of school districts exerts a positive, as 
hypothesized, and signi® cant in¯ uence on teachers. No 
in¯ uence is exerted by population density. The second col­
umn displays estimation of the non-teachers per student 
equation. The Her® ndahl score does not exert a signi® cant 
in¯ uence on numbers of non-teachers, while numbers of 
school districts exerts a positive, as hypothesized, and sig­
ni® cant in¯ uence on non-teachers. No in¯ uence is exerted 
by population density. The third column displays estima­
tion of the administrators per student equation. The 
Her® ndahl score exerts a positive, as expected, signi® cant 
in¯ uence on numbers of administrators, and numbers of 
school districts exerts a positive, as hypothesized, and 
signi® cant in¯ uence on administrators . Density exerts a 
signi® cant negative eŒect on administrators ± an eŒect 
opposite to expectations. 
Column 4 displays estimation of the verbal SAT score 
equation. Teacher and non-teacher variables do not exert 
signi® cant eŒects, but number of administrators exerts a 
positive eŒect on scores thus indicating that counties with 
more administrators tend to exhibit higher scores. The 
Her® ndahl score exerts a positive (unexpected) and signi® ­
cant eŒect on verbal SAT scores. Population density exerts 
a negative (as expected) and signi® cant in¯ uence on verbal 
scores. Percentage of seniors taking SAT tests exerts the 
expected negative and signi® cant in¯ uence on verbal 
scores. Median education exerts the expected positive and 
signi® cant in¯ uence on verbal scores. 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum STD.DEV 
Administrators per student 0.003 0.00005 0.008 0.0011 
Teachers per student 0.049 0.002 0.083 0.009 
Non-teachers per student 0.007 0.001 0.013 0.001 
SAT verbal 419 364 456 22.12 
SAT math 476 419 528 27.90 
Droput rate 3.65 0 8 1.60 
Her® ndahl score 0.295 0.056 1.00 0.288 
Districts per student 0.001 0.00003 0.005 0.001 
Population density 587.87 1.62 16 002 2126.39 
% seniors taking SAT test 33.11 16.84 61.57 9.71 
Median education 13.22 12.20 15.40 0.64 
Table 2. SUR Estimates of employmen t and performanc e equations in 1992 
Teachers Non-teachers Administrators SATV SATM Dropout 
Constant 0.04
a 
0.01
a 
0.002
a 71440.50b 7219.09a 14.42a 
53.33 25.86 17.65 2.39 3.15 3.77 
Teachers 874.59 591.30 75.70 
1.43 0.08 0.14 
Non-teachers 73067.72 7454.80 301.81c 
1.33 0.17 1.90 
Administrators 6431.05
c 730.19 7952.95a 
1.76 0.01 2.72 
Her® ndahl 0.01
a 
0.001 0.001
a 
17.00
b 
22.48
b 70.12 
3.90 0.77 4.05 2.26 2.53 0.17 
Districts 5.14
a 
0.59
a 
0.64a 
10.97 3.78 8.80 
Density 7E-08 75E-08 78E-08b 70.01a 70.001 0.0002 b 
0.27 0.63 2.13 4.60 1.12 2.19 
Takers 71.62a 72.22a 
4.52 5.26 
Median education 43.32a 55.91a 70.75a 
9.34 10.18 2.62 
Adj. R2 0.72 0.20 0.66 0.60 0.64 0.32 
s.e.e. 0.0039 0.001 0.001 14.22 16.73 1.34 
n 57 57 57 57 57 57 
a;b;cNotes: refer to signi® cance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. 
Column 5 displays estimation of the math SAT score 
equation. No employment category exerts a signi® cant 
eŒect on scores. The Her® ndahl score exerts a positive 
(unexpected) and signi® cant eŒect on math SAT scores. 
Percentage of seniors taking SAT tests exerts the expected 
negative and signi® cant in¯ uence on verbal scores. Median 
education exerts the expected positive and signi ® cant in¯ u­
ence on verbal scores. 
Column 6 displays estimation of the dropout equation. 
While teachers do not exert a signi® cant eŒect on dropout 
rates, non-teachers (positive) and administrators (negative) 
exert sign® cant eŒects. That is, higher numbers of non-
teachers appear to raise dropout rates, while higher num­
bers of administrators lower dropout rates. Population 
density exerts a positive and signi ® cant eŒect on dropout 
rates, and median education exerts a negative, as hypothe­
sized, and signi® cant eŒect on dropout rates. 
Estimation of the 1993 equation 
Table 3 displays SUR estimations of employment and per­
formance equations for 1993. The ® rst column displays 
estimation of the teachers± student equation. The 
Her® ndahl score exerts a positive, as hypothesized, and 
signi® cant in¯ uence on numbers of teachers thus providing 
evidence that market power results in higher use of 
teachers. Numbers of school districts exerts a positive, as 
hypothesized, and signi® cant in¯ uence on teachers. No 
in¯ uence is exerted by population density. The second col­
umn displays estimation of the non-teachers per student 
equation. The Her® ndahl score does not exert a signi® cant 
in¯ uence on numbers of non-teachers, while numbers of 
school districts exerts a positive, as hypothesized, and sig­
ni® cant in¯ uence on non-teachers. No in¯ uence is exerted 
by population density. The third column displays estima­
tion of the administrators ± student equation. The 
Her® ndahl score exerts a positive, as expected, signi® cant 
in¯ uence on numbers of administrators, and numbers of 
school districts exerts a positive, as hypothesized, and sig­
ni® cant in¯ uence on administrators. Density exerts a sig­
ni® cant negative eŒect on administrators ± an eŒect 
opposite to expectations. With the exception of density 
exerting a signi® cant eŒect on numbers of administrators 
(versus no eŒect in 1992), the results of the ® rst three 
columns mirror those found in 1992. 
Column 4 displays estimation of the verbal SAT score 
equation. Teachers do not exert signi® cant eŒects (as in 
1992), but numbers of non-teachers exert a negative eŒect 
on verbal scores (versus no eŒect in 1992). As in 1992, 
numbers of administrators exert a positive eŒect on verbal 
scores. Unlike the positive and signi ® cant eŒect in 1992, the 
Her® ndahl score does not exert a signi® cant eŒect on ver­
bal SAT scores. As in 1992, population density exerts a 
negative and signi® cant in¯ uence, the percentage of seniors 
taking SAT tests exerts negative and signi® cant in¯ uence, 
and median education exerts the expected positive and sig­
ni® cant in¯ uence on verbal scores. 
Column 5 displays estimation of the math SAT score 
equation. No employment category exerts a signi® cant 
eŒect on math scores ± thus mirroring results in 1992. 
Contrary to 1992, the Her® ndahl score no longer exerts a 
positive and signi® cant eŒect on math SAT scores. Density 
Table 3. SUR Estimates of employmen t and performanc e equations in 1993 
Teachers Non-teachers Administrators SATV SATM Dropout 
Constant 
Teachers 
Non-teachers 
Administrators 
Her® ndahl 
Districts 
Density 
Takers 
Median education 
Adj. R2 
s.e.e. 
n 
0.04
a 
24.16 
0.01
b 
2.48 
5.31
a 
6.42 
9E-07 
0.62 
0.48 
0.007 
53 
0.01
a 
18.12 
0.001 
0.73 
0.51
a 
2.77 
73E-07 
0.92 
0.15 
0.001 
53 
0.002
a 
10.39 
0.001
a 
3.32 
0.59
a 
6.06 
77E-08 
0.35 
0.52 
0.001 
53 
7116.43b 
2.26 
411.00 
1.04 
73982.94c 
1.81 
11 866.06
a 
3.57 
1.78 
0.23 
70.01b 
2.03 
71.40a 
5.51 
42.40a 
10.39 
0.60 
13.70 
53 
7121.25b 
2.23 
7349.10 
0.84 
1969.85 
0.85 
75.395.09 
1.53 
72.60 
0.32 
0.01c 
1.80 
71.51a 
5.65 
47.80a 
11.13 
0.75 
14.05 
53 
14.85
b 
3.39 
19.33 
0.56 
153.32 
0.89 
7995.93a 
3.26 
70.63 
0.76 
0.0002 
0.81 
70.78a 
2.43 
0.28 
1.44 
53 
a;b;cNotes: refer to signi® cance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. 
exerts a positive and signi® cant eŒect, versus no eŒect in 
1992. As in 1992, percentage of seniors taking SAT tests 
(negative) and median education (positive) exert signi® cant 
in¯ uences on verbal scores. 
Column 6 displays estimation of the dropout equation. 
As in 1992, teachers do not exert a signi® cant eŒect. But, 
while non-teachers exerted a positive, but weakly signi® ­
cant, eŒect in 1992, it no longer exerts a signi® cant eŒect. 
However, as in 1992, numbers of administrators exert a 
negative and signi® cant eŒect on dropout rates. Unlike 
its positive and signi® cant eŒect in 1992, population den­
sity does not signi® cantly in¯ uence dropout rates. Finally, 
median education continues to exert a negative and signi® ­
cant eŒect on dropout rates. 
V . CONCLUSIONS 
The hypothesis that monopoly power of school districts 
allows bureaucratic expansion and poor academic perform­
ance has been tested in the public school system of 
California. Evidence indicates that monopoly power is 
positively associated with employment of administrators 
and teachers, thus supporting the bureaucratic expansion 
hypothesis. No support is found for the case of non-
teachers. 
The hypotheses that higher employment of teachers and 
administrators exert negative eŒects on performance, as 
measured by SAT scores and dropout rates, are not sup­
ported. Variation in numbers of teachers does not explain 
any variation in performance measures. However, higher 
employment of administrators is found to raise verbal SAT 
scores and lower drop out rates. Higher numbers of non-
teachers are also found to lower verbal SAT scores (in 
1993) and raise drop out rates (in 1992), thus providing 
some evidence that this employment group exerts negative 
eŒects on performance. The evidence appears to suggest 
that California public schools hire too few administrators 
and too many non-teachers, based on the prediction that 
greater numbers of administrators and fewer non-teachers 
would raise verbal SAT scores and lower drop out rates. 
The evidence also indicates that performance diŒerences 
are unrelated to variation in numbers of teachers ± thus 
suggesting that the public push towards smaller class sizes 
may not raise student achievement. 
While misallocation of sta� ng resources may suggest 
bureaucratic over-expansion, this result simply indicates 
that staŒresources are misallocated in the California pub­
lic school system. Bureaucracy theory is one model that 
explains resource misallocation, but others reasons may 
also explain why too many non-teachers and too few 
administrators appear to be hired. As just mentioned, ris­
ing public pressures that place hiring priorities on teachers 
may crowd-out non-teachers and administrators. 
Equalization policies may also contribute to resource 
misallocation when funding decisions focus on spending 
equality, which is not necessarily related to performance 
equality across schools and school districts. Public pres­
sures on hiring more teachers and spending equalization 
policies may therefore in¯ uence resource allocation and, 
because they do not emanate from competitive pri­
vate market pressures, they do not necessarily re¯ ect e� ­
ciency-enhancing reallocations of school resources. The 
weak California economy in 1992± 1993 may also have 
played a role in misallocation that may be resolved over 
time. 
From a public policy viewpoint, this paper suggests that 
a focus ± either by the public or policymakers ± on teacher± 
student ratios is not necessarily the most productive means 
of fostering higher performance in our public school 
systems. As previously discussed, e� cient resource alloca­
tion does not necessarily result in uniform teacher± student 
ratios across schools since marginal products, input prices, 
and budgets vary across schools. Public pressures and/or 
policymakers that force uniformity may contribute to 
lower overall performance when `magic’ formulae for 
teacher± student ratios are promoted. It should also be 
noted that variation of sta� ng across schools does not 
necessarily indicate bureaucratic over-expansion since vari­
ation may simply be a product of schools trying to adopt 
their uniquely e� cient hiring ratios, or a product of public 
pressures to hire more teachers, equalization policies, or a 
weak economy. Moreover, it is di� cult to know what con­
stitutes e� cient sta� ng decisions when private market 
counterparts that must endure the competitive pressures 
of the marketplace are fairly weak or absent. When 
employment is related to monopoly power, Niskanen’s 
theory of bureaucracy predicts that public school staŒ 
operate at relatively high levels of autonomy from sponsors 
due to substantial monitoring costs and lack of private 
market counterparts with which to make comparisons of 
such items as costs and performance. Sponsors are there­
fore likely to ® nd oversight a relatively di� cult endeavour 
and it should not be surprising that arguments for higher 
funding are di� cult to assess since they may be self-
interested attempts to over-expand or genuine attempts 
to improve educational performance in least-cost manners. 
However, given high monitoring costs and lack of com­
parative information in private markets, sponsor-focus 
on teacher± student ratios may be rational since it is a fairly 
easy statistic to view and compare across other public 
schools. Unfortunately, this paper provides evidence that 
even if rational for sponsors, reallocations towards other 
inputs such as administrators and away from teachers and 
non-teachers may oŒer more promise for performance 
gains. 
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